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Abstract
A two-sector OLG model illuminates the intergenerational e¤ects
of a tax that protects an environmental stock. A traded asset capi-
talizes the economic returns to future tax-induced environmental im-
provements, beneting the current asset owners, the old generation.
Absent a transfer, the tax harms the young generation by decreas-
ing their real wage. Future generations benet from the tax-induced
improvement in environmental stock. The principal intergenerational
conict arising from the tax is between generations alive at the time
society imposes the policy, not between generations alive at di¤erent
times. A Pareto-improving tax can be implemented under various
political economy settings.
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1 Introduction
Most analyses of stock-related environmental problems use assumptions im-
plying that people alive today must sacrice to preserve consumption oppor-
tunities for those alive in the future. The focus on the conict between agents
who live at di¤erent points in time, obscures the conict between di¤erent
types of agents alive when the policy is rst implemented. An overlapping
generations (OLG) model with endogenous asset prices shows that suitable
transfers amongst those currently alive causes all generations to benet from
environmental policy.
Ramsey models that contain an environmental stock and endogenous cap-
ital, e.g. climate models such as DICE (Nordhaus 2008), typically use a
one-commodity setting in which output can be either consumed or invested.
When investment is positive, the normalization that sets the commodity price
to 1 implies that the asset price is xed, also at 1. In these models, environ-
mental policy a¤ects the trajectory of an environmental stock, which a¤ects
the future productivity of capital, thereby altering current investment. In
this setting, the trajectory of capital is endogenous but the price of capital
is xed. The xed asset price means that these models exclude a channel
through which policy-induced changes in future productivity e¤ect the level
and distribution of welfare.
To examine the role of asset prices, we reverse these assumptions: there
is a xed or exogenously changing stock of capital and no depreciation, forc-
ing the price of capital to be endogenous and responsive to policy-induced
changes in future productivity. For given environmental stocks, stricter envi-
ronmental policy reduces current real aggregate income, exactly as in previ-
ous models. Stricter policy also lowers the current real wage and rental rate
of capital; in that respect the welfare e¤ect of policy is symmetric across fac-
tors of production. However, by increasing future rental rates via improved
environmental stocks (relative to Business as Usual, or BAU), the stricter
policy increases the price (as distinct from rental rate) of the asset. In our
model, environmental policy increases the welfare of current owners of capi-
tal, because the higher asset price more than o¤sets the lower current rental
rate. Despite the policys symmetric e¤ects on real returns to the two factors,
capital and labor are fundamentally asymmetric: the price of capital reects
future productivity, whereas the price of the labor depends only on current
productivity. This di¤erence drives the welfare comparisons.
In our OLG setting, agents live for two periods and can use an environ-
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mental tax. The current old generation owns capital, which it sells to young
agents. Because a tax lowers current aggregate real income and increases
the welfare of old agents, it necessarily decreases the rst period utility of
young agents. Young agents benet from the policy-induced environmen-
tal improvement in the second period of their life, but under circumstances
relevant to most environmental problems, this second period utility benet
does not compensate for the rst period loss. Therefore, absent transfers,
environmental policy increases lifetime welfare of the (rst period) old asset-
rich and lowers the lifetime welfare of the young asset-poor. However, the
rst-period old generation can retain all of the benets of the higher asset
value and compensate the young using only revenue from the environmental
tax. In this way, the old rich pay the young poor to accept stricter environ-
mental policy. They make this transfer not because of a moral imperative,
but because it is in their interest to do so: absent the transfer, the young
have no reason to agree to implement the policy.
We consider two types of policy settings. In the rst, we obtain analytic
results, summarized above, for arbitrary perturbations from BAU. We then
use numerical methods to study the Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) in a
dynamic political economy setting. These numerical results support and il-
lustrate the analytic results. In each period of this game, the current old and
young generations pick a current tax to maximize their aggregate lifetime
welfare. They understand that this tax a¤ects the evolution of the environ-
mental stock and future equilibrium taxes, which a¤ect future rental rates.
The current tax thus a¤ects the current asset price, and current generations
welfare. Recent papers use similar dynamic settings to study MPE in politi-
cal economy games involving redistribution and/or the provision of a public
good (Hassler et al., 2003, 2005 and 2007; Conde-Ruiz and Galaso, 2005;
Klein et al., 2008; Bassetto, 2008). Although environmental considerations
motivate our research, we rely heavily on elements more commonly used in
macroeconomics, particularly the focus on asset prices, the OLG structure,
and the emphasis on endogenous policy determination.
The literature examining environmental policy in OLG models neglects
the role of asset prices that we emphasize. Kemp and van Long (1979) and
Mourmouras (1991) are among the rst to use an OLG framework with re-
newable resources. Later contributions study welfare when a social planner
corrects an environmental externality (Mourmouras, 1993; Howarth, 1991,
1996, 1998; Howarth and Norgaard, 1990, 1992; Krautkraemer and Batina,
1999; Rasmussen, 2003). John et al. (1995) discuss the steady state ine¢ cien-
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cies under environmental externalities, and John and Pecchenino (1994) con-
sider the transitional dynamics. Marini and Scaramozzino (1995) study time-
consistent scal policy under environmental externalities. Laurent-Lucchetti
and Leach (2011) note that current owners of capital capture the benets of
policy-induced innovation. Bovenberg and Heijdra (1998, 2002) and Heijdra
et al. (2006) note that the issuance of public debt achieves intergenerational
transfers, thus providing a means of compensating the current generation for
sacrices that benet future generations. Public debt ameliorates the miss-
ing market arising from the inability of agents living in di¤erent periods to
trade directly with each other. We show that asset price endogeneity facil-
itates Pareto-improving policy even if the government cannot use bonds to
distribute income across generations.
Lucas (1978) models the equilibrium pricing of productive assets. Several
papers recognize that asset prices depend on adjustment costs, without, how-
ever, developing the idea that the endogenous asset price might provide an
incentive for current generations to improve the welfare of future generations
(Huberman, 1984; Hu¤man, 1985, 1986; and Labadie, 1986). Our dynamic
general equilibrium model is similar to that of Copeland and Taylor (2009).
However, we have rents in the manufacturing sector, leading to the asset
price, which is central to our analysis. In addition, we emphasize the tran-
sitional dynamics under selsh agents, whereas they consider exclusively the
steady state under a social planner. Our model is close to that of Koskela
et al. (2002) in its OLG structure, but di¤ers by separating conventional
capital and the renewable resource into di¤erent sectors and by allowing for
open-access in the latter; see also Galor (1992) and Farmer and Wendner
(2003).1
There are previous challenges to the conventional view that environmen-
tal policy requires sacrices by those alive today. Correcting multiple market
failures jointly might be a win-winopportunity; e.g., a reduction of green-
house gas emissions, beneting future generations, might also reduce tran-
sient local pollutants, beneting those currently living. Rebalancing societys
investment portfolio, reducing saving of man-made capital and increasing sav-
ing of environmental capital, might also benet all generations (Foley, 2009;
Rezai et al., 2012). We exclude these possibilities.
1Guesnerie (2004), Hoel and Sterner (2007) and Traeger (2012) examine the impor-
tance, to dynamic environmental policy, of imperfect substitutability between goods that
rely (primarily) on either environmental or on man-made capital. In a two-good (general
equilibrium) model, this imperfect substitutability alters the relative price of commodities.
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2 Model
There is a single endogenously changing stock, the environment. Agents liv-
ing in di¤erent periods cannot trade directly with each other, and we rule out
the use of public debt to achieve intergenerational transfers. Agents live for
two periods and they care only about their own lifetime welfare; their only
means of inuencing the future is to change their current use of the environ-
mental stock. These assumptions bias the model against Pareto-improving
environmental policy. However, an environmental tax with appropriate allo-
cation of tax revenues creates a Pareto improvement and can be implemented
in a political economy equilibrium.
One sector, manufacturing, produces a goodM using mobile labor and
a sector-specic input, capital. The stock of capital is xed, K  1. (Appen-
dix B1 considers the case where the stock or productivity of capital changes
exogenously.) The other sector produces a good F using labor and an en-
dogenously changing resource stock, x. We suppress time indices where no
confusion results. There are perfect property rights for the stock of man-
ufacturing capital, and no property rights for the resource stock. Absent
environmental policy, mobile labor competes away all rent in the resource-
intensive sector.
Young agents receive a wage, income from the resource sector, and possi-
bly a share of tax revenues. They divide their income between consumption
and savings, in the form of shares in the rm. The old generation earns the
prots from the manufacturing rm, the proceeds from selling the rm, and
its share of the tax revenue. The non-altruistic old generation consumes all
of its income. The size of each cohort is xed and normalized to 1.
Competitive labor and commodity markets clear in each period. Employ-
ment in the resource sector equals L, and free movement of labor between
the sectors ensures that the return to labor there equals the manufactur-
ing wage. Manufacturing is the numeraire good, and the relative price of
the resource-intensive good is P . Output in the resource-intensive sector is
F = Lx, with the constant  > 0. Manufacturing output is M = (1  L)
with 0 <  < 1, so that there are prots (rent) in this sector;  is labors
share of the value of manufacturing output. The old generation owns the
only asset, K, which it sells to the young generation after production occurs.
The open access of the resource sector means that too much labor moves
to this sector. An ad-valorem tax, T , on production of the resource-intensive
good reduces this misallocation. The revenue accruing to workers in the
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resource sector, under the tax, equals P (1  T )Lx. Society returns the tax
revenue, R = PTLx, in a lump sum, but possibly di¤erent shares, to the
young and old generations.
Agents have intertemporal additive utility, with the single period utility
function u (cF;t; cM;t), where ci;j is the consumption level of good i at time
j. Their pure rate of time preference is . Agents take as given, or have
rational point expectations of the wage (wt), relative commodity price (Pt),
asset price (t), share of tax receipts (Rt), and prots (t). A tilde over
a next-period variable signies a point expectation. The lifetime decision
problem of the agent who is young in period t, is
max
cyF;t;c
y
M;t;c
o
F;t+1;c
o
M;t+1;st
u(cyF;t; c
y
M;t) +
1
1 + 
u(coF;t+1; c
o
M;t+1) (1)
subject to the budget constraints in the rst and second periods of their life:
wt + tRt  Pt cyF;t + cyM;t + tst; and (2)
st(~t+1 + ~t+1~st+1) + (1  ~t+1) ~Rt+1  ~Pt+1coF;t+1 + coM;t+1; (3)
where st is the fraction of shares that the young agent purchases. In equilib-
rium, supply of shares equals demand, i.e. st  1 8t; hereafter we suppress
st. The superscripts o and y on consumption variables indicate whether the
agent is old or young at a point in time. We suppress those superscripts if
the meaning is clear from the context. The young agent spends all of her
time to working and the old agent manages the manufacturing rm.
The utility function is Cobb-Douglas: u() = cF;tc1 M;t , with  the constant
budget share for the resource-intensive good. With e equal to expenditures
and    (1  )1 , an agents single period indirect utility is
v(e; P ) =
e
P
(1  ) e
1
1 
= P e: (4)
With identical homothetic preferences, the share of income devoted to
each good, and the equilibrium commodity price, are independent of both
the level and distribution of income. The ratio of demand for both goods is a
function of this price. The requirements that workers are indi¤erent between
working in either sector, P (1   T )x = w, and that manufacturing rms
maximize prots, determine the wage, the allocation of labor, and supply of
both goods. The relative price, P , causes product markets to clear. These
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equilibrium conditions for the labor and product markets lead to the following
expressions for the values of L, w, and P :
L = 1 T1 

+1 T , w = 

1 + 1 T1 


1 
P = w
(1 T )x =


1+ 1 T1 
 
1 
(1 T )x  p(x; T ):
(5)
The equilibrium allocation of labor and the wage depend on the tax T
but not on the resource stock, x. However, the equilibrium commodity price
depends on x because the stock a¤ects the supply of the resource-intensive
good. Firmsprots, , the tax revenue, R, and the sectoral values of output,
PF and M , also depend only on T and model parameters:
 = 1 

w(1  L), R = T
1 TLw,
M = (1  L), PF = 
1 (1  L):
(6)
Systems (5) and (6) determine the static equilibrium of the economy.
2.1 The asset price
The young buy manufacturing rms from the old; the asset price a¤ects
welfare through expenditure. Systems (5) and (6) enable us to express the
young and old generations expenditure levels, ey and eo, as functions of
current tax T and the asset price, (x;T), where T is the tax trajectory:
ey = w(T )+R(T ) (x;T) and eo = (T )+ (1 )R(T )+(x;T): (7)
Under BAU, T = 0. The standard rst order condition for optimal saving
behavior requires that the youngs marginal loss in utility from purchasing a
unit of the asset in the current period equals her discounted marginal gain in
utility from having that asset in the next period. This condition determines
the demand for the asset as a function of its current price and the expectation
of next period rental rate and price. The demand function and the xed (or
exogenously changing) supply of capital, determine the current asset price as
a function of expected next period rental rate and price, leading to:
Proposition 1 The price of a unit of capital equals the stream of future
dividends, arising from the rms prots, discounted at the equilibrium rates
of intertemporal substitution: t = Pt
P1
i=1(1 + )
 iP t+it+i.
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(The appendix contains proofs not found in the text.) Due to the assumption
of Cobb Douglas utility, the indirect utility function is linear in expenditures,
so the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is innite. As in Lucas (1978),
the equilibrium rate of intertemporal substitution is constant and equal to
the pure rate of time preference, .
Current asset owners, the old, benet from a policy that increases the
asset price. The changed asset price has no e¤ect on the welfare of asset
purchasers, the young. Given that saving behavior is optimal, the young pay
for the asset exactly what is worth to them in terms of discounted utility.
Although the change in asset price changes their current expenditures, the
o¤setting change in future receipts leads to a zero change in their welfare:
Corollary 1 (i) An unanticipated change in the asset price does not a¤ect
the lifetime utility of current and future young generations. (ii) Unanticipated
changes in the asset price a¤ect only the current old generation.
2.2 Resource dynamics
We assume that the resource stock obeys a logistic growth function:
xt+1 = xt + rxt
 
1  xt
C
  L(Tt)xt =  1 + r  1  xtC   L(Tt) xt
= (1 + rt(Tt; xt))xt; with rt  r (Tt; xt) =
 
r
 
1  xt
C
  L(Tt) ; (8)
with r the intrinsic growth rate, C the carrying capacity of the resource, and
r (T; x) the endogenous growth rate of the resource. A higher tax conserves
the resource because it causes labor to seek employment in the manufacturing
sector: dLt
dTt
< 0) drt
dTt
> 0) dxt+1
dTt
> 0. An output tax is an e¢ cient means
of reducing current resource use.
The steady state, x1, is dened as the solution to r (T1; x1) = 0; we
restrict parameter values to ensure that under BAU there exists an inte-
rior steady state to which trajectories beginning near that steady state con-
verge monotonically. The necessary and su¢ cient conditions for this are
0 < d(1+r)x
dx
< 1, evaluated at T = 0, x = x1. These inequalities are equiva-
lent to
1 < & < 2 with &  r +  (1  ) +  (1  )
 (1  ) +  : (9)
7
Denote x^ as the solution to r (0; x^) =  1 and dene the interval X^ = (0; x^),
the set of initial conditions for which subsequent stocks are positive under
BAU. We assume that x0 2 X^. The BAU growth function, r (0; xt)xt is
single-peaked, but not monotonic; therefore, the BAU equilibrium trajectory
need not be monotonic over time. However, for any x0 2 X^, all subsequent
BAU stocks, x1, x2, ... are in the interval for which (1 + r(0; x))x is an
increasing function of x; the trajectory after the initial period is therefore
monotonic with respect to time.
2.3 Relation to one-commodity Ramsey models
The real wage, P w, and the real rental rate, P , equal the amount of
utility that an agent obtains by renting out one unit of labor or one unit of
capital, respectively. These real factor returns depend on both the tax and
the stock of the resource.
Our model has two features in common with familiar one-commodity
Ramsey models: the current tax reduces current aggregate utility and reduces
both the current real wage and the real rental rate. We emphasize this
similarity, lest the reader mistakenly think that our main results depend on
incidental features of the model.
Proposition 2 (i) An increase in the tax at time t reduces aggregate period-
t utility. (ii) For a predetermined level of the environmental stock, a higher
tax decreases both the real wage and the real rental rate. (iii) A higher en-
vironmental stock increases aggregate utility and both the real wage and the
real rental rate.
The tax causes labor to leave the resource sector, reducing the nomi-
nal wage and increasing nominal prots. The tax also reduces the supply
from the resource sector, thereby increasing the relative commodity price, P .
Therefore, the tax unambiguously decreases the real wage. In a more general
model, the e¤ect of the tax on the real return to capital is ambiguous. In
our model, the tax-induced commodity price increase dominates the increase
in nominal return, so the tax reduces the real return to capital. The higher
stock has no direct e¤ect on nominal returns, but it lowers the commodity
price and therefore increases both real returns. Thus, a change in the stock
or the tax have the same qualitative e¤ect on the two real returns. In this
important respect, the model treats the two factors symmetrically. The gen-
eral equilibrium framework shows how changes in the environmental stock
8
Figure 1: Consumption expansion paths under BAU (A   A0) and under an
environmental policy (B  B0  B00)
a¤ect the real return to factors that do not directly depend on this stock 
manufacturing capital in our model.
Figure 1 uses a production possibility frontier to illustrate the welfare
e¤ect of environmental policy both in standard Ramsey models and in our
OLG model. Under BAU, current aggregate consumption is at point A,
a level that maximizes current aggregate utility, ignoring the environmental
externality. The tax moves consumption to point B, where current aggregate
utility is lower. Therefore, someone must have lower current utility at B than
at A.
Figure 1 illustrates the conventional view that environmental policy cre-
ates a conict between those alive today and those alive in the future. The ag-
gregate (single period) consumption path under BAU moves along the curve
from A to A0, a trajectory that incorporates changes in both environmental
and man-made capital stocks, including technological change (introduced in
Appendix B1). The aggregate consumption trajectory under the environ-
mental policy moves along the curve from point B to B00. Agents alive at the
initial time have higher current aggregate utility under trajectory AA0, and
those alive later have higher (single period) aggregate utility under trajectory
BB00, so dynastic (rather than OLG) models lead to the conventional view
that a welfare comparison depends on the social discount rate.
Previous challenges to the conventional view, including the existence of
win-win opportunities or the possibility of rebalancing societys investment
portfolio, suggest that society might move from trajectory AA0 to trajectory
B0B00, thus increasing aggregate utility in each period. Our model excludes
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those possibilities. Environmental policy lowers aggregate current utility in
the rst period, just as in the standard Ramsey framework. The current old
live for a single period, so the tax increases their lifetime welfare if and only
if it increases their utility in the current period. The current young are also
alive in the next period. Their lifetime welfare depends on utility in both
periods of their life.
Although a higher tax and a higher environmental stock have the same
qualitative e¤ects on the real wage and the real rental rate, the two factors
are fundamentally asymmetric: the price of capital depends on future rental
rates, whereas the price of labor depends on only its current value of marginal
productivity. Current owners of capital benet from the future increases in
productivity created by the environmental policy, even though they are not
alive to enjoy them directly. Absent transfers, current owners of labor benet
from these future productivity increases only to the extent that they are alive
to enjoy them.
3 Welfare E¤ects of a Tax
Under BAU, the environmental tax is identically 0. Consider an arbitrary
non-negative tax trajectory, the vector T, with element Ti  0. The index
i denotes the number of periods in the future, so i = 0 denotes the current
period; Ti > 0 for at least one i, including i = 0 (because consideration of
delayed policies yields only obvious results). A non-negative perturbation of
the zero tax BAU policy is T = "T, with "  0 the perturbation parameter.
A larger " therefore is equivalent to a higher tax policy. We assume that the
fraction of tax revenue given to the young, , is constant, and establish:
Proposition 3 For all  2 [0; 1], a small tax increase (" > 0) benets the
current old generation. This benet increases in its tax share, (1  ).
The intuition for Proposition 3 follows from the fact that a small tax has
only a second order e¤ect on the real rental rate (as can be seen by inspection
of equation (A.16) in the Appendix). However, a small tax leads to a rst
order positive e¤ect on the next period resource stock. By Proposition 2
(iii), these higher future stocks increase the future real rental rate. As noted
above, that increase arises because a higher stock leads to a higher equilib-
rium supply and lower equilibrium price of the resource good. Given that
the interest rate is xed at the discount rate, these higher real rental rates
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translate unambiguously into a higher rst period asset price (by Proposition
1), which increases the (rst period) old generations real income. We have:
Corollary 2 The tax decreases rst-period utility of the present young gen-
eration.
Proof. Propositions 2 and 3 state that the tax decreases aggregate current
utility and increases the old generations utility. Therefore, rst-period utility
of the current young must fall.
The OLG framework shows that a policy that discourages over-use of
a resource benets asset holders and in the rst period harms the young
agents. The policy also changes the consumption of the current-young in the
next period, thereby creating the possibility of higher lifetime welfare. To
avoid uninteresting complications, we assume for the rest of this section that
T1 = T0 > 0.
Proposition 4 For a constant  2 [0; 1], a small increase in tax rates (larger
") increases lifetime welfare of the present young generation if and only if:
(a) it receives less than the entire tax revenue while young ( < 1), and (b)
the resource is below its BAU steady state and the agent is su¢ ciently patient
( is su¢ ciently small).
From Corollary 1, the young generations life-time expenditure equals its
wage income plus its share of tax revenue when young and old. The proof of
Proposition 4 shows that the tax has a zero rst order e¤ect on the utility
value of the sum of the wage and the tax revenue. Therefore, if the young
generation obtains all of the tax revenue ( = 1), the tax has a zero rst
order e¤ect on its lifetime welfare. If the young generation receives some tax
revenue in the next period ( < 1), it might benet or be harmed by the
tax policy. It benets if the discounted gain due to the larger environmental
stock in the next period exceeds the loss in current utility due to the tax. Our
assumptions on functional forms and of constant tax rates and sharing rules
in the rst two periods, imply that the net benet is positive if and only if
(1+r(0;xt))

1+
> 1. This inequality implies that the present value increase in next
periods tax revenue due to the policy-induced change in the environmental
stock exceeds 1.
The young generation cares about the distribution of tax revenues, re-
gardless of whether it benets from the tax policy. Given the constraint that
 2 [0; 1] is constant, we have
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Proposition 5 The young generation prefers a constant  = 0 (i.e. receipt
of all tax revenue when its old) if and only if it benets from a tax introduc-
tion. If the policy lowers their welfare, they prefer to receive all of the tax
revenue while young.
In summary, if the environmental problem is that the resource is below
its 0-tax steady state and therefore recovering, but just not recovering suf-
ciently quickly, then su¢ ciently patient young would support a tax that
speeds recovery. In that circumstance, both the young and the old genera-
tions want all of the tax revenue to go to the old, under the constraint that
the share is constant. In the more relevant circumstance where the environ-
mental objective is to keep the resource from degrading excessively (i.e. the
stock lies above its BAU steady state, so r < 0), the young would oppose a
tax that helps to solve the problem. If such a tax were forced upon them,
and the tax share  were constant, they would prefer to receive all of the tax
revenue while young. Thus, in the case that is relevant to most problems in-
volving environmental stocks, this OLG model shows that there is a conict
between generations alive at the time society imposes the tax. The old gen-
eration favors the environmental policy because some of the future benets
of that policy are capitalized into the asset value. The current young obtain
none of those capitalized benets, and they do not live long enough to reap
signicant benets from the improved environment.
A small tax creates only a second order loss in static e¢ ciency, the
e¢ ciency calculation that holds the trajectory of the resource stock xed.
However, the tax has a positive rst order e¤ect on the trajectory of the
resource, and that increased stock creates a rst order welfare gain. There-
fore, there always exists a tax trajectory that benets all generations born
after the initial period. Absent transfers, a constant tax is more likely to
benet future generations compared to the current young generation: the
tax-induced higher stock benets each of the future generations in two pe-
riods, whereas it benets the current young generation in only one period.
(Appendix B2.)
4 Transfers
Proposition 4 and 5 are based on the assumption that the old in each period
receive the same share of tax revenue, i.e. that 1    is constant. That
12
assumption is useful for understanding the distributional e¤ect of environ-
mental policy, but it might be a poor policy prescription. The old in the
period when the tax is imposed unlike the old in any other period cap-
ture the future benets that are capitalized in the asset price (Corollary 1).
In addition, the young in future periods benet from a higher resource stock
(relative to BAU) in both periods of their life; the young in the current pe-
riod benet from environmental protection in only the second period of their
life. Therefore, it is reasonable to treat the old and the young in the period
when the policy is introduced di¤erently than their counterparts in future
periods. In particular, the current young should receive a larger share of tax
revenues, compared to the young in future periods.
Given an appropriate transfer, both generations can benet from the tax
even when under BAU the resource is degrading, r(0; xt) < 0. The proof of
Proposition 4 shows that a small tax has only a second order welfare e¤ect
on the young if they receive all of the tax revenue while young ( = 1). We
noted above that the old obtain a rst order welfare gain even if they receive
none of the tax revenue. Given these two results it is not surprising that for
a small tax, it is always possible for the old generation to make a transfer
to the young, in addition to giving them all of the tax revenue, so that both
generations are better o¤. This compensation requires that the old give the
young a portion of the tax-induced increase in the asset value.
An alternative means of compensating the young is to give them a higher
share of tax revenue, compared to the future young. One way to do this
is to decrease  (thereby increasing the share that todays young receive
in the next period, when they are old) and simultaneously to give todays
young the fraction  of todays old generations share of tax revenue. This
transfer scheme ( > 0), which occurs only in the rst period, allows the rst
period old to keep all of the capital gains and the fraction (1  ) (1  )
of tax revenue. In this way, the future young (rather than the current old)
compensate the current young to make the latter willing to accept the tax
policy. We state this formally:
Proposition 6 For constant  < 1 there exists a tax transfer rate 0  crit <
1 from the present old to the present young such that with  > crit, a small
tax policy with T0 = T1 > 0 creates a Pareto improvement.
Because the young gain under this tax and transfer, an argument par-
allel to that which establishes Proposition 5 implies that for any  > crit,
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both generations prefer  = 0. The fact that a tax and transfer combination
creates a Pareto improvement for the generations alive at the time society
imposes the policy is noteworthy because it arises in a model that appears
biased in favor of nding that an environmental policy harms some genera-
tion. Agents alive at the time the policy is imposed do not care about the
welfare of future generations. In addition, they have only one means of accu-
mulation: protecting the environment. That protection always requires that
aggregate rst period utility of consumption falls.
5 Political Economy Equilibria
In each period, both generations can gain from a tax, given proper allocation
of tax revenues. Here we numerically compare the equilibria under BAU, a
social planner who maximizes the present discounted value of the stream of
aggregate utility, and two political economy models. In the political economy
models, we consider a Markov Perfect equilibrium (MPE). Agents condition
the choice of the current tax, T , and the current sharing rule, , on the only
directly payo¤-relevant state variable, the environmental stock. The MPE
consists of a policy function mapping the state variable into the current policy
variables. If it is optimal for current agents to set the current policy levels
equal to the value returned by that policy function, given their belief that
future agents will use that policy function, then we have a MPE.
The rst political economy setting uses a probabilistic voting model (Lind-
beck and Weibull, 1987; Perrson and Tabellini, 2000; Hassler et al., 2005).
Each of two parties presents a platform consisting of the current values of
(T; ) and an exogenous ideological component. Agents in the two genera-
tions currently living care about the consumption transfers achieved through
the political process (T and ); their preference for ideology is orthogonal to
the transfers. Preferences may di¤er between two groups, but agents within
a group have the same random preference for consumption relative to ideol-
ogy. The greater is a groups relative preference for ideology, the fewer swing
voters there are in that group, and the less incentive the political parties
have to select (T; ) in an e¤ort to woo voters in that group. In equilibrium,
the political parties choose the same endogenous platform (T; ), and each
party has equal chance of winning the election.
The equilibrium (T; ) maximizes a political preference function, a
weighted combination of the groupsnon-ideological component of welfare
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(which depends only on consumption). Because each generation has the
same number of voters, the generation with weaker ideological preferences
has the highest weight in this function. The current value of  appears lin-
early in this preference function, so the equilibrium  is on the boundary of
its feasible set if the generationsrelative preference for consumption di¤ers,
and is indeterminate if the generations have the same relative preference.
The second political economy setting uses a Nash bargaining model.
In every case, successorsequilibrium decision rules a¤ect current decision
makersincentives. In this game, the equilibrium tax is typically not Pareto
e¢ cient, just as in Battaglini and Coate (2007). Bargaining between those
currently alive does not resolve the conict across generations that live dur-
ing di¤erent periods. Generations in the future always prefer that previous
generations use a larger tax, to generate a larger environmental stock. Our
point is simply that starting with a major unsolved environmental problem,
here represented by a zero BAU tax, all generations can be made better o¤
when agents alive at each point are able to use a politically determined tax,
even when they do not care about the welfare of those who will live in the
future.
5.1 The games
Here we provide the details of the social planner benchmark and the two po-
litical economy models. The social planner corrects the environmental exter-
nality and the distortion arising from the inability of generations living in dif-
ferent periods to trade with each other. This planner maximizes the present
value of the stream of single period aggregate utility. The nominal value of
national income in period t is Y (Tt) = PtFt + (1  L) = t + wt + Rt and
the aggregate utility in period t (real national income) is p (xt; Tt)Y (Tt).
(Throughout this section we suppress the constant , which merely scales
utility.) Schneider, Traeger and Winkler (2012) explain the problems with
using parameters that describe individual preferences in an OLG setting to
calibrate a social discount rate. Nevertheless, we take the social discount
rate to be the individual agents pure rate of time preference, so that the so-
cial planners problem is time-consistent. The social planner has a standard
optimal control problem:
maxfTtg1t=0
P1
t=0 (1 + )
 t p(xt; Tt) Y (Tt)
subject to xt+1 = (1 + rt(xt; Tt))xt with x0 given.
(10)
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Given the solution to this problem (and the fact that utility is linear in in-
come), we can use the asset price equation in Proposition 1 to determine the
equilibrium asset price, and thereby determine the intergenerational distrib-
ution of welfare under the social planner.
The two political economy models induce di¤erent endogenous policy
functions. The function Tt = (xt) gives the equilibrium current period
tax and it also induces an equilibrium asset price (measured in units of util-
ity), the functional  (xt+1;(xt+1))  P t t. By purchasing the asset from
the old in period t, the agent who is young in period t obtains the utility
derived from prots and asset sales when she is old. This functional satises
the recursion:
 (xt; Tt) =
1
1 + 

p (xt+1;(xt+1)) ( (xt+1)) +  (xt+1;(xt+1))
	
:
(11)
Equation (11) is the rst order condition for optimal saving behavior of the
young agent. The function t =  (xt) gives the equilibrium share of tax
revenues that the time-t young generation receives. Our goal is to nd the
pair of equilibrium policy functions  and , which di¤er in the two political
economy models. In both cases, an equilibrium requires that given agents
belief that Tt+i = (xt+i) and t+i =  (xt+i) for i > 0, the decisions for
the agents choosing the current tax and sharing rule are Tt = (xt) and
t =  (xt).
In the probabilistic voting model, the political preference function as-
signs the weight 1 to the old generations consumption-related welfare, and
the weight 1 + , with  2 ( 1;1), to the young generations lifetime
consumption-related welfare. Using  = Y   w   R and the old genera-
tions expenditure eo =  + (1  )R + , we write this political preference
function as
Wt  p(xt; Tt) Y (xt; Tt) +  (xt; Tt)
+p t [wt + tRt] +
1+
1+
p t+1
 
1  t+1

Rt+1

:
(12)
The current Tt; t maximize this function, given beliefs about pt+1, Rt+1,
and t+1, which depend on xt+1 and the next-period policy functions,  and
. The preference function Wt is linear in t, so in equilibrium t is on
the boundary of its feasible set, [bl; bu]; these bounds represent institutional
16
constraints that we take as exogenous. We nd (numerically) that in equi-
librium, for all t, Rt > 0, which implies that t = bu if  > 0 and t = bl
if  < 0. The current t is indeterminate, and thus the equilibrium Tt i
is indeterminate for i  1 if  = 0. The equilibrium value of  changes
discontinuously as  passes through 0. However, given , both Wt and the
maximizing Tt are continuous in . Hereafter we assume that  6= 0, so that
the equilibrium in this voting model is determinate, and also that jj  0,
which enables us to replace the preference function with
~Wt = p(xt; Tt)
 Y (xt; Tt) +  (xt; Tt) +
1
1 + 
p t+1
 
1  t+1

Rt+1

; (13)
with the understanding that t+1 is a constant, equal to either bl (if  < 0)
or bu (if  > 0). The political preference function is independent of t, a
consequence of the assumption that jj is arbitrarily small. However, the
function depends on t+1, which determines the revenue split between the
current young and next-period young. A larger value of t+t means that the
next-period young receive more of the next-period tax revenue. When the
equilibrium tax is increasing in the stock, a higher value of t+1 decreases
current agentsincentive to protect the stock.
The second political economy setting, emphasized in the numerical analy-
sis, uses a Nash bargaining model in which failure to reach an agreement on
the current T;  results in a zero tax. The disagreement policy T = 0
implies zero tax revenue, making the choice of the disagreement  irrelevant.
The equilibrium  is bounded here, so we do not impose exogenous con-
straints on its feasible set. (If a constraint on  is binding, the numerical
problem becomes more complicated; see Appendix B3.) With unconstrained
, the equilibrium to the Nash bargaining problem can be found in two steps.
Given the policy functions  and  that current agents expect future agents
to use, the current Tt maximizes ~Wt and the current t splits the surplus
equally between the two generations. This surplus equals the di¤erence
between the maximized value of ~Wt and its value when Tt = 0.
In summary, for both political economy models, the equilibrium solves
maxTt U
o
t + U
y
t = maxTtfp  (xt; Tt)Y (Tt)
+ (xt; Tt) +
1
1+
p (xt+1;(xt+1)) [1   (xt+1)]R( (xt+1))g
subject to xt+1 = (1 + rt(Tt; xt))xt with xt given.
(14)
Problem (14) states that the objective is to maximize the sum of the lifetime
utility of the current old and the current young generation. This maximand
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equals the utility value derived by both generations from current national
income, and from owning the asset and receiving the tax revenue in the next
period. The solution to the problem depends on the functions () and  ()
and on the induced function  (). In the voting model,  () returns the
constant bu (for  > 0) or bl (for  < 0), and in the Nash bargaining model
 () splits the surplus. In both models, () returns the maximand to the
problem in equation (14). Because the function  () di¤ers across the two
models, so does () and  ().
The primitives of the model lead to explicit expressions for the func-
tions p (x; T ) and Y (T ). Equation (11) recursively determines the func-
tion  (xt; Tt). Agents at time t take the functions (xt+1),  (xt+1) and
 (xt+1;(xt+1)) as given, but they are endogenous to the problem. We
obtain a numerical solution using the collocation method and Chebyshev
polynomials (Judd, 1998; Miranda and Fackler, 2002); see Appendix B4.2
5.2 Calibration
We set the parameter , the share of the resource-intensive commodity in
the consumption basket, equal to 0:2. We set  = 0:6, the approximate wage
share in U.S. manufacturing. We set the annual pure rate of time preference
at 2%=year which gives  = 0:41 assuming one period lasts 35 years.
We model the renewable resource as easily exhaustible and slowly regener-
ating, in order to capture the idea that the environmental problem is serious.
We choose units of the resource stock, x, such that its carrying capacity is
normalized to one, C = 1, so that x equals the capacity rate. The productiv-
ity parameter  equals the inverse of the amount of labor that would exhaust
the resource in a single period, starting from the carrying capacity x0 = 1.
We set  = 3:33 and r = 1:37 which is equivalent to an uncongested growth
rate of 2:5%=year. On a 0-tax trajectory the resource continues to degrade
to a steady state of x1 = 0:285. System (15) summarizes the parameter
values:
 = 0:2;  = 0:6;  = 1; r = 1:37;  = 3:33: (15)
2Models of this genus typically have multiple equilibria, as a consequence of the innite
horizon. Experiments suggest that our numerical approach always returns a unique equi-
librium. An algorithm that iterates over the value function can be interpreted as the limit
as the horizon goes to innity of a nite horizon model. In view of the generic uniqueness
of nite horizon models, the uniqueness of the numerical results is not surprising.
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Figure 2: Left panel: the phase diagram for the resource stock under Nash bar-
gaining (solid), BAU (dashed), and the social planners equilibrium (dot-dash).
Right panel: the tax policy under the social planner (dot-dash) and Nash bargain-
ing (solid).
For this parameter set, the old generation has a higher expenditure level
than the young under BAU for any stock level. Here, the asset-rich and the
asset-poor correspond to the rich and the poor. This calibration also ensures
that the young agent can always a¤ord to pay the asset price given her wage
income along the equilibrium trajectories. The BAU trajectory is monotonic
if and only if x0  0:73. For larger initial conditions, the BAU trajectory
drops below the steady state of 0:28 in the rst period and then approaches
the steady state monotonically from below.
5.3 A social planner
Figures 2 and 3 contain information on equilibria under the social planner
(dot-dash graphs), BAU (dashed graphs), and the MPE under Nash bar-
gaining (solid graphs). The left panel in Figure 2 shows the phase diagrams
and the right panel shows the social planner and Nash bargaining tax func-
tions. The equilibrium stock and tax trajectories are higher under the social
planner than under the alternatives. The social planners steady state tax is
T = 0:40, which induces a steady state level of x = 0:51.
Under the social planner, the stock trajectory is a monotonic function of
time. In contrast, under BAU, for large initial values of x, the subsequent
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Figure 3: Left panel: The asset price function under Nash bargaining (solid), the
social planner (dot-dash), and BAU (dash). Right panel: Welfare e¤ects of Nash
bargaining tax policy relative to BAU for initial resource stock x0 = 0:45 (dashed)
and x0 = 0:9 (solid).
level of x is below the steady state. (See the dashed curve in left panel of
Figure 2.) The BAU trajectory rst overshoots the steady state and then ap-
proaches the steady state from below. The possibility of overshooting helps
to explain why the planners tax policy is non-monotonic in the stock (right
panel in gure 2), and also why the asset value, in units of utility, is (vir-
tually) monotonic in the stock under the social planner, but non-monotonic
under BAU (left panel Figure 3). At high values of the resource stock, a high
tax prevents the stock from overshooting the steady state, as would occur
under BAU. At low values of the resource stock, a high tax helps the re-
source to regenerate. The planners tax therefore reaches a minimum for an
intermediate value of the stock. Under BAU, the possibility of overshooting
causes the asset value to be a non-monotonic function of the stock. A low
current resource stock leads to low future stocks and low dividends (the real
return to capital), in view of Proposition 2.iii. At a su¢ ciently high cur-
rent resource stock, overshooting causes future stocks and real rental rates
of capital to be low.
As we noted in discussing Figure 1, a policy intervention always decreases
rst period aggregate utility. Thus, the standard interpretation of results in
the Ramsey model implies that policy requires those alive in the present to
sacrice for those alive in the future. Our (standard) choice of the social
planners maximand means that she pays no attention to the asset market.
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Nevertheless, her policy sequence changes the asset price sequence; in partic-
ular, her intervention creates a capital gain for the rst-period asset owner.
The resulting transfer from the future to the present means that intervention
by the social planner increases the lifetime aggregate welfare of those alive
in the rst period. Ramsey models that either ignore the asset market, or
adopt assumptions that make that market trivial, ignore the possibility that
all generations can gain from policy intervention.
5.4 The Nash bargaining equilibrium
Figures 2 and 3 also show outcomes under the Nash Bargaining MPE given
by the solution to (14), where  =  (x) splits the surplus between the
generations. Despite the lack of altruism here, this political equilibrium
leads to a higher next period stock, compared to BAU, for any current stock:
environmental policy protects the resource. The steady state stock level in
the political economy equilibrium is 0:38, 33% higher than the BAU level.
The MPE equilibrium tax policy, although lower than the social planners,
leads to a utility value of the asset between the BAU and social planner
levels. The higher asset values, relative to BAU, compensates generations
currently living for the direct loss in utility caused by the tax.
Figure 3, right panel, shows agentswelfare under the MPE tax, relative
to BAU levels. For future generations (i  1) the gure shows the welfare
gain of the young agent, and for the current generation (i = 0) it shows the
aggregate lifetime welfare gain for the current young and old generations.
The dashed curve corresponds to the initial condition x0 = 0:45 and the solid
curve corresponds to x0 = 0:9. For intermediate initial conditions, the welfare
gain lies between these two curves. If the economy starts out slightly higher
than the with-policy steady state, agents gain because under BAU welfare
would fall to a low level as the resource degenerates. If the initial resource
stock is far above the steady state, future generations additionally benet
because the tax prevents overshooting. For large initial stocks (x0 = 0:9),
the gain in moving from BAU to Nash bargaining is large; as the stock falls
toward the bargaining steady state, the extent of BAU overshooting also falls,
so the welfare gain falls over time. For moderate initial stocks (x0 = 0:45),
Nash bargaining keeps the stock above the steady state x = 0:38, whereas
under BAU the stock would approach x = 0:28; in this case, the welfare gain
rises over time. Nash bargaining increases the rst generationsaggregate
welfare by 0.5 2%, and increases the steady state welfare by 6%.
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Figure 4: Left panel: The equilibrium sharing rule under Nash bargaining (solid)
and in the probabilistic voting model where the young generation has more swing
voters ( = 1: light gray, dot-dash) and where the old generation has more swing
voters ( = 0: dark gray, dash). Middle panel: The equilibrium tax policy
corresponding to these three cases. Right panel: the asset price corresponding to
the three cases.
5.5 Comparison of political economy models
Here we compare the Nash bargaining and the probabilistic voting equilibria.
In the latter,  is on the boundary of its feasible set if generations have
di¤erent preference for ideology relative to consumption. We take the feasible
set [bl; bu] = [0; 1] and consider the two cases where the young have (slightly)
more or fewer swing voters than the old, corresponding to  = 1 and  = 0.
The left panel of Figure 4 shows the equilibrium  (x) in the Nash bargaining
game and in the two probabilistic voting models; the middle panel shows the
tax policy rules corresponding to these three case, and the right panel shows
the asset price. There are three results.
First, the equilibrium  under Nash bargaining exceeds 1 and increases
with the stock. The young receive all of the tax revenue and additional
transfers from the old; the transfers increase with the size of the stock. Recall
that the current allocation of labor depends only on the current tax, and that
the threat point involves a zero current tax. Moreover, at high stock levels
there is overshooting under BAU. A zero current tax harms the current
young because it leads to a lower stock in the second period of their life.
The zero tax harms the current old because it lowers the next period stock,
lowering the asset value. At large stocks, where overshooting occurs under
22
BAU extraction, this decrease in asset price is particularly strong. Both
generations lose under a zero tax, but for our calibration, the loss is greater for
the old than for the young, especially at higher stock levels. Consequently,
the young extract a transfer from the old in addition to all tax revenues.
Proposition 6 notes that with a small exogenous tax, the young are better
o¤ even if they receive only a fraction of tax revenues. Here, however, the
endogenous tax is not small, and we require that the youngs surplus equal
the olds, not merely that it is positive.
Second, the tax functions are higher, the lower is the function  (x). In
all cases the equilibrium tax depends on the next period value of , but not
on its current value. The current value determines the revenue split between
the currently living agents, whereas the next period value of  determines
the fraction of revenue that the next-period young receive. For most of the
stock levels, the equilibrium tax increases in the stock. Over this interval, a
higher t+1 gives current agents less incentive to protect the stock, because
more of the benet of conservation accrues to the next-period young. Thus,
higher values of t+1 induce smaller current taxes.
Third, the di¤erence in equilibrium tax rules and asset values under Nash
bargaining, where  is unconstrained, and under probabilistic voting when
the young have more swing voters ( = bu = 1) is negligible. Therefore,
we do not consider sensitivity analysis with respect to bu. We do, however,
consider other types of robustness checks, based on quite di¤erent political
economy models. RefereesAppendix B5 reports these alternatives; the
qualitative results described in the text are robust to the alternatives in the
appendix.
6 Discussion
Analysis of stock-related environmental policy often starts from the presump-
tion that this policy requires current sacrices in order to protect future gen-
erations. Existing challenges to this presumption include the existence of
win-win situations, or the possibility of making agents in all periods better
o¤ by reallocating savings from man-made to natural capital. We provide a
di¤erent perspective, using a model that excludes these kinds of challenges
to the conventional view.
The key to our result is that the policy-induced improvements in the
future environmental stock, relative to BAU, increase the value of a traded
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productive asset, capital. This benet more than o¤sets the fall in the current
real rental rate, caused by the tax-induced increase in the relative commod-
ity price. The tax therefore increases the welfare of the old generation, who
owns the asset. Asset prices are a means of transferring gains in the future
to the present period. The young generation bears the policy cost in the rst
period of their life, without beneting from the change in asset price. If the
environmental stock is decreasing on the BAU trajectory, the tax reduces
their welfare. However, if the old give the young a su¢ ciently larger share of
the tax revenue compared to the share that future young generations will
obtain both generations are better o¤. Future generations are also better
o¤ because of the improved environmental quality. Such Pareto-improving
policy can be implemented and sustained in various political economy set-
tings.
We presented these results using a generic renewable resource model,
but an important motivation for the research arises from the controversy
surrounding climate policy, and in particular the extent to which meaning-
ful policy reduces currently living agentswelfare. The generic renewable
resources model has the virtue of simplicity and familiarity, but it is not
designed to study climate policy. For that purpose, the following features
are useful: an endogenously changing capital stock, leading to a model with
at least two state variables, the environmental stock and the capital stock;
a source of friction that maintains a non-trivial asset price, i.e. that pre-
vents the price of capital from being identically equal to the price of the
composite consumption good; and a richer range of utility functions, e.g.,
dropping the assumption of innite elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
Ongoing research conrms that the qualitative insights of the simpler model
presented here, survive under empirically plausible circumstances in the more
complicated setting.
Real economies contain many di¤erent types of capital, whereas our
model, like most integrated assessment models used to study climate pol-
icy, has a single type of capital. In real economies, environmental policy
likely decreases the price of some assets and increases the price of others.
For example, climate policy would reduce the value of coal mines and coal-
red power plants, but increase the value of assets in the renewable energy
sector; stricter shing quotas would decrease short run shing prots but
might increase the value of the shing eet, or some other sector-specic
asset. A model with a single type of capital cannot capture this range of
possibility. However, if asset owners have a diversied portfolio, the single-
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asset approximation may be reasonable. Asset owners care about the price
of their portfolio, not the price of a specic asset.
In our closed economy general equilibrium model, the privately owned
asset competes with the open access resource for mobile labor. A higher
resource stock increases the wage and reduces the nominal return to the
asset. But because of changes in the relative commodity price, the higher
stock increases the assets real return. The general equilibrium framework
emphasizes the link, in a closed economy, between the endogenous relative
commodity price and the real rental rate or asset price. This link disap-
pears in a composite-commodity model, where nominal and real returns are
equivalent. The general equilibrium model is also suitable for comparing the
incentives to protect a resource across closed and small open economies; in
the latter, the relative commodity price is xed, just as in the composite
commodity model. Work in progress shows that opening a closed economy
to trade signicantly alters the incentives to protect a resource.
Our paper considers the distributional e¤ects of a policy that ameliorates
a particular market failure, weak property rights to a resource. However, the
message of our paper is more general, and likely applies to other market and
political failures. E¤orts to improve such defects often create transitional
costs to society; a regime bent on reform may make matters worse in the
short run. The message of our paper is that even if di¤erent groups (owners
of capital and labor in our model) face qualitatively similar short run e¤ects
(lower real returns in our model) the groupsdi¤erential ownership of assets
may cause them to face qualitatively di¤erent welfare e¤ects. People who
own assets are able to capture some of the future benets of reform, via
the asset market. Those without assets benet from the reforms only to the
extent that they will be alive long enough to enjoy them, or if they receive
transfers from currently living beneciaries. If the principal benet of reform
occurs after the lifetime of those without assets, as is the case in our model,
then transfers are needed to sustain support for the reform. However, even
a rather pessimistic political environment, one without altruism, intergener-
ational borrowing, or commitment devices, can produce such support.
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A Proofs
Proof. Proposition 1. The vector Tt consists of taxes in periods t, t + 1,
t + 2,... . The price of a rm this period is t and the expectation of the
next-period price is ~t+1. In equilibrium the young generation buys st shares
of the rm today and sells st+1 of it in the next period. With intertemporally
additive, homothetic lifetime utility, the present value of total utility of the
young agent is:
Uyt = P
 
t e
y
t +
1
1+
 ~P t+1~e
o
t+1 =  
P t (wt + tRt   st (xt;Tt)) + 11+ ~P t+1
h
(1  ~t+1) ~Rt+1 + st (~t+1 + ~st+1~(xt+1;Tt+1))
i!
:
(A.1)
If a young person buys one share of the factory today, costing t, the
loss in utility is P t t assuming that t < wt.
3 Purchase of one share of
the factory today increases expenditures next period by ~t+1 + ~st+1~t+1; the
increase in the present value of utility next period due to the purchase of
the factory is 1
1+
 ~P t+1 (~t+1 + ~st+1~t+1). The equilibrium price-of-factory
sequence requires that excess demand for the asset is 0, which, under ratio-
nal expectation, requires satisfaction of the rst order condition for optimal
saving behavior
P t t =
1
1 + 
P t+1 (t+1 + t+1) : (A.2)
Write this rst order condition, equation (A.2), as
t =
1
1 + 

Pt
Pt+1

(t+1 + t+1) (A.3)
or
t+i =
1
1 + 

Pt+i
Pt+1+i

(t+i+1 + t+i+1) ; (A.4)
so
t =
1
1 + 

Pt
Pt+1

t+1 +
1
1 + 

Pt
Pt+1
 
1
1 + 

Pt+1
Pt+2

(t+2 + t+2)

:
(A.5)
3Throughout our derivations, we assume that such a non-negativity constraint is not
binding.
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By repeated substitution obtain
t =
SX
j=1

1
1 + 
j 
j 1s=0

Pt+s
Pt+s+1

t+j

+

1
1 + 
S 
S 1s=0

Pt+s
Pt+s+1

t+S

(A.6)
If the system converges to a steady state, then the second term goes to 0 as
S !1 and
t =
1X
j=1

1
1 + 
j 
j 1s=0

Pt+s
Pt+s+1

t+j

: (A.7)
Note that
j 1s=0

Pt+s
Pt+s+1

=

Pt
Pt+j

(A.8)
Using this relation we have
t = P

t
1X
i=1
(1 + ) iP t+it+i: (A.9)
Proof. Corollary 1. (i) The imposition of the rst order condition simplies
the lifetime welfare expression of the young, equation (A.1), to:
Uyt = 

p(Tt; xt)
 (w(Tt) + tR(Tt)) +
p(Tt+1; xt+1)
 
1 + 
(1  t+1)R(Tt+1)

:
(A.10)
The rst order condition implies that the young generations utility is inde-
pendent of the asset price. A loss in utility from the higher asset price in
the rst period equals the discounted utility gain from increased prots and
asset price in the second period. As a consequence, the young generations
expenditure equals wage income in the rst period and their share of the
tax revenue in the rst and second period. Their welfare considerations are
limited to these expenditure components and the price e¤ects.
(ii) The same holds for all future generations. Asset prices enter only the
welfare expression of the current old generation. The current owners of the
asset capture all future benets reected in a changed asset price.
Proof. Proposition 2. (Sketch) (i) Using systems (5) and (6), the nominal
value of national income in period t is
Y (Tt) = PtFt + (1  L) : (A.11)
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We multiply nominal national income by P  to convert dollars to utils;
P = p(xt; Tt) is a function of both the tax and the environmental stock.
Using the equilibrium expressions for Y (T ) and p (x; T ), The single period
aggregate utility is
U (xt; Tt)  p(xt; Tt) Y (Tt) = xt  (Tt) , (A.12)
with  (Tt)  
0B@

1 + 1 T1 


1 
(1  T )
1CA
 
: (A.13)
Di¤erentiating with respect to T and simplifying gives, for T 6= 0,
dU
dT
=  P  (1  )LT
(1  T )2 Y < 0: (A.14)
(ii) The tax decreases the nominal wage, w, and increases the equilibrium
relative price, P , and therefore decreases the real wage.
The real rental rate is P . The tax lowers the equilibrium nominal
wage, increasing nominal prots, , but it also increases the commodity price.
Using the fact that preferences are homothetic and that the wage share is
constant, we have
P  = P (1  ) Y
1  : (A.15)
Di¤erentiating this with respect to T gives, for T 6= 0,
dP 
dT
= 
1  
1  
dP Y
dT
=  P  (1  )LT
(1  T )2 Y < 0: (A.16)
(iii) A higher stock does not a¤ect the nominal wage but it decreases
the equilibrium relative price, so it increases the real wage. A higher stock
does not alter nominal prots, but decreases the commodity price, thereby
increasing real prots.
Proof. Proposition 3. We begin by establishing two inequalities, which we
then use to prove the proposition:
(i)
@xt+i
@Tt+i 1
> 0 and (ii)
@xt+i+1
@xt+i
> 0 for i  1 and xt 2 X^ (A.17)
The rst inequality states that a tax in any period increases the stock in
the next period; the second inequality states that for all initial conditions
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xt 2 X^, a higher stock in any future period t + i leads to a higher stock in
the subsequent period, t+i+1. The discussion below equation (8) establishes
inequality (A.17.i). To establish inequality (A.17.ii), we use the fact that the
BAU mapping from xt to xt+1 is single-peaked and reaches its maximum at
x = C&
2r
= 1
2
 
x1 + Cr

< x1 (with the inequality following our restriction
on &). Dene X =
 
0; C&
2r

, the set for which the mapping (1 + r(0; xt))xt
is strictly monotonically increasing. Due to monotonicity, the set X is ab-
sorbing: for any xt 2 X, xt+1 2 X. Strict monotonicity implies that a small
increase in xt 2 X leads to an increase in xt+1. X  X^ and, in addition, for
any initial condition xt 2 X^, xt+1 2 X. To verify this claim, consider the
two sets X and X^=X. For xt 2 X, xt+1 2 X because X is absorbing. For
xt 2 X^=X, xt+1 2 X follows from the denition of the sets X and X^ and the
fact that the growth function is single-peaked.
The old generations remaining lifetime welfare consists of the utility it
obtains from current consumption,
U ot (") = 
 
p (xt; Tt)
 (1  )Rt +
1X
i=0
(1 + ) ip (xt+i; Tt+i)
  t+i
!
:
(A.18)
We start with the derivative of the second term in U o, the return to holding
the asset. We di¤erentiate each term in the sum by Ti = " Ti, recognizing
that Ti has a direct e¤ect on t+ip t+i and an indirect e¤ect, via its e¤ect on
xt+j, on t+jp t+j for j > i. We use Ti = " Ti, so dTi = Tid".
d
P1
i=0(1+)
 iip t+i
d" =
@tp
 
t
@Tt
Tt + (1 + )
 1
h
@t+1p
 
t+1
@Tt+1
Tt+1 +
@t+1p
 
t+1
@xt+1
@xt+1
@Tt
Tt
i
+(1 + ) 2
h
@t+2p
 
t+2
@Tt+2
Tt+2 +
@t+2p
 
t+2
@xt+2

@xt+2
@Tt+1
Tt+1 +
@xt+2
@xt+1
@xt+1
@Tt
Tt
i
+(1 + ) 3
h
@t+3p
 
t+3
@Tt+3
Tt+3 +
@t+3p
 
t+3
@xt+3

@xt+3
@Tt+2
Tt+2 +
@xt+3
@xt+2
@xt+2
@Tt+1
Tt+1 +
@xt+3
@xt+2
@xt+2
@xt+1
@xt+1
@Tt
Tt
i
+ ::::
(A.19)
We simplify this expression using the fact that at " = 0, T0 = T1 = ::: = 0.
Evaluating the di¤erent expressions along the BAU trajectory, we have
@ip
 
i
@Ti
= 0; 0 = 1 = ::: = ; and
@ip
 
i
@xi
= x 1i , with   

w

 
> 0:
(A.20)
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Using the convention that
j 1Q
j
zj = 1, we write the ith term in the sum above
as (1 + ) ii, with
i  x 1t+i
"
i 1X
j=0
(
@xt+i j
@Tt+i j 1
Tt+i j 1
 
j 1Y
k=0
@xt+i k
@xt+i k 1
!)#
 0: (A.21)
The inequality i  0 holds strictly for some i; this claim uses inequalities
(A.17 i and ii) and the assumption, ~Tt+i j 1  0 with strict inequality for
some i  j   1  0.
The old also receive a share of the tax revenue. The e¤ect of a tax increase
on current tax revenue is
dP (1  )R
d"

"=0
= (1  )RdP
 
d"| {z }
=0
+(1  )P  dR
d"

"=0
= (1  )P 


1 + 
(1 )
 
1  
Tt > 0 (A.22)
Given that the derivatives of both terms in U o are positive, a small tax
trajectory increases the welfare of the old generation.
For a positive current tax, Rt > 0, and the old generations utility strictly
increases in its share of the tax revenue.
Proof. Proposition 4. The lifetime welfare of the young, from equation
(A.10), is
Uyt (") = p( Tt"; xt)
 
 
w( Tt") + R( Tt") +
 
1 + r( Tt"; xt)

1 + 
(1  )R( Tt+1")
!
:
(A.23)
Di¤erentiating this expression with respect to " gives
dUyt
d"
=
d
d"
P t (w( Tt")+R( Tt"))+
d
d"
"
P t
 
1 + r( Tt"; xt)

1 + 
(1  )R( Tt+1")
#
:
(A.24)
The pre-tax allocation maximizes current aggregate utility. Therefore, the
tax has a zero rst order e¤ect on aggregate current utility: dP
 w
d"

"=0
+
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dP 
d"

"=0
+ dP
 R
d"

"=0
= 0. Equation (A.16) shows that dP
 
d"

"=0
= 0,
which implies
d[P (w+R)]
d"

"=0
= 0. Using this relation, and the assumption
T0 = T1, we write equation (A.24) as
dUyt
d"
=  (1  ) d
d"
"  
1 + r( Tt"; xt)

1 + 
  1
!
P t R( Tt")
#
(A.25)
Using the fact that R(0) = 0, this equation simplies to
dUyt
d"
=  (1  )P t

(1 + r(0; xt))

1 + 
  1

dR( Tt")
d"

"=0

: (A.26)
The rst-order response of tax revenue to a small tax introduction is positive:
dR( Tt;")
d"

"=0
= 
1 

1 + 
(1 )
 
Tt > 0. Consequently, we have
dUy0
d"

"=0
> 0, (1  )

(1 + r(0; x0))

1 + 
  1

T0 > 0: (A.27)
With  2 [0; 1], a small tax increases the lifetime welfare of the young gen-
eration if and only if  < 1 and (1 + r(0; xt))
 > (1 + ). A small tax
creates a zero rst order welfare e¤ect for the young generation that receives
all tax revenue ( = 1). Condition (b) in the Proposition is equivalent to
r(0; xt) > (1 + )
1
   1. For  > 0, the expression on the right side of the
previous inequality is positive. Thus, a necessary condition for the young to
benet from a tax is that the resource is below its 0-tax steady state, and is
in the process of su¢ ciently strong recovery.
Proof. Proposition 5. The last equation in system (5) implies that p(Tt; xt+1)  =
p(Tt; xt)
 (1 + r(Tt; xt)). This equality and the fact that the young gener-
ations welfare is linear in , from equation (A.10), implies that
dUyt
d
< 0, Tt

(1 + r(Tt; xt))

1 + 
  1

> 0: (A.28)
We also have drt
dTt
> 0. This inequality and inequalities (A.27) and (A.28)
imply that if the young benet from a small tax, then they prefer to receive
all of the tax revenue when they are old, i.e. they prefer  = 0. In contrast,
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if the young are harmed by a small tax, then provided that the tax is small
they prefer to receive all of the tax revenue when young ( = 1).
Proof. Proposition 6. With  the share of the old generations tax revenue
transferred to the young in the period when the tax is rst imposed, the
rst periods tax receipts are now (0+ (1 0))R0 for the young and (1 
0)(1 )R0 for the old. Under the assumption that current and next period
tax rates are changed by the same small amount and that  is constant, an
argument similar to that in the proof of proposition 4 leads to the following
condition for the young to benet from the combined transfer and tax:
dUy0
d"

"=0
> 0, (1  )

(1 + r(0; x0))

1 + 
  (1  )

T0 > 0: (A.29)
Setting  = 0, equation (A.29) reproduces equation (A.27). For
 > crit  1  (1 + r(0; x0))

1 + 
(A.30)
the young strictly prefer the combined tax and transfer compared to the
BAU status quo. Even if the resource is degrading on the BAU trajectory,
crit < 1. Therefore, by transferring less than their entire share of the tax
revenue to the young, the old can make the young better o¤ under a small
tax. Because Proposition 3 states that the tax improves the old generations
welfare even if they receive none of the tax revenue, the old are also better
o¤ under the combined tax and transfer, compared to the status quo.
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B Appendix for The Political Economy of
Environmental Policy with Overlapping Gen-
erations
This appendix collects supplementary information alluded to in the journal
publication.
B1 Exogenous Productivity Growth
In the context of most environmental problems, the natural resource is de-
grading on the 0-tax trajectory. In our model of constant productivity and
capital, the world becomes poorer and future generations have lower welfare
on that trajectory. This Appendix introduces exogenous productivity growth
in both sectors. Let a  0 be the growth rate of total factor productivity
in manufacturing and b  0 the growth rate of e¢ ciency in output per unit
ow of the resource. Sectoral output is
Mt = e
at(1  Lt) and Ft = ebtLtxt:
The inequality a > 0 can also be interpreted as exogenous growth in the
stock of capital. The extraction of the resource is still Ltxt (not ebtLtxt).
This model of resource productivity growth implies that each extracted unit
of the resource increases the supply of the resource-intensive commodity. If
we think of the resource as being energy, the assumption means that the
economy becomes less energy intensive. The assumption of exponential pro-
ductivity growth simplies the discussion, but the next proposition also holds
if the productivity parameters a and b decrease over time. The exponential
productivity growth implies a growth factor of e(a b) (1 + r(Tt; xt)) for the
price level and of ea for all other variables (wt, Rt, and t). For the follow-
ing proposition we assume that  2 (0; 1) is constant and that there is no
transfer between generations, i.e.  = 0.
Proposition 7 A larger value of a  b increases the stringency of the neces-
sary and su¢ cient condition under which a small constant tax increases the
welfare of the young.
1
Proof. Using a derivation parallel to that contained in the proof of propo-
sition 4, we have
dUy0
d"

"=0
> 0, (1  )

e (a b) (1 + r(0; x0))

1 + 
  1

T0 > 0:
The second inequality is equivalent to
1 + r(0; x0)
e(a b)

> 1 + : (B.1)
The left side of inequality (B.1) is decreasing in a  b, so an increase in a  b
decreases the set of parameter values and initial conditions under which the
inequality is satised, i.e. the circumstances under which the young benet
from the tax.
Under proportional growth (a = b), the condition for the young to benet
from the tax is the same as when a = b = 0. The welfare e¤ect of the tax, for
the young, depends on the change in the price level. A ceteris paribus increase
in a  b increases the next period relative supply of the manufacturing good,
thereby increasing the future relative price of the resource-intensive good,
Pt+1. The higher price lowers the marginal utility of next period income,
making it less likely that the young are willing to forgo income today in
order to have higher income in the next period. For a > b, the young would
require a higher transfer from the old in order to agree to the tax. If,
however, the productivity in the resource sector grows much faster than in
the manufacturing sector (b >> a), the young might support a tax even
when the resource is shrinking on the 0-tax trajectory, and in the absence of
a transfer.
B2 Future generations
Merely in order to avoid uninteresting complications, we assume that for
future generations the tax is constant: T0 = T1 = T2:::. The life-time welfare
of the next young generation is
Uy1 (") = p( T1"; x1)
 
 
w( T1") + R( T1") +
 
1 + r( T1"; x1)

1 + 
(1  )R( T2")
!
:
2
Di¤erentiating this expression with respect to " gives
dUy1
d"
=
d
d"
P 1 (w( T1")+R( T1"))+
d
d"
"
P 1
 
1 + r( T1"; x1)

1 + 
(1  )R( T2")
#
Using the simplications found in the proof of Proposition 4, (including
R(0) = 0 and @P
 
1
@x1
= P 1 x
 1
1 ) the expression simplies to
dUy1
d"

"=0
> 0 , T1P 1 (1  )

(1 + r(0; x1))

1 + 
  1

dR
d"

"=0
>   T0w(0)@P
 
1
@x1
@x1
@T0
, (1  )

(1 + r(0; x1))

1 + 
  1

T0 >  

w(0)x 11
@x1
@T0

1
dR=d"j"=0

T0
Comparing this condition to inequality (A.27), we see that when the stock
is degrading (i.e. r(0; x0) < 0), a small tax is more likely to benet the next
periods young generation compared to todays, which always loses in the
absence of transfers. The di¤erence arises for two reasons: A lower stock
increases the BAU growth rate, dr(0;xt)
dxt
=  r < 0, so that the left side is less
negative. The right side of the inequality above is negative. Therefore, the
condition here is weaker than the condition in inequality (A.27). In fact, it
is satised for any initial stock value in the calibration used in Section 5.
B3 Nash Bargaining
Using equations (5) - (7), we dene the lifetime welfare of the two agents
U o (xt;(xt) ; t) = P
 eo
= p (xt;(xt)) [( (xt)) + (1  t)R( (xt))] + (xt;(xt)):
Uy (xt;(xt) ; t) =
= p (xt;(xt)) [w( (xt)) + tR( (xt))]
+ 1
1+
p (xt+1;(xt+1))
 
1  t+1

R( (xt+1) :
Denote
~U o (xt) = U
o (xt; 0; ) and ~Uy (xt) = Uy (xt; 0; ) ;
the value of lifetime utility of the two agents when they impose a zero tax
in the current period. Under a 0 tax, R = 0, so the current value of 
3
does not a¤ect the agentslifetime welfare. Therefore ~U o (xt) and ~Uy (xt)
do not depend on . They do, however, depend on the current value of
x and of course they depend on the decision rules used in the future; they
are functionals. The pair

~U o (xt) ; ~U
y (xt)

is the threat-point in the Nash
bargaining game. Total surplus equals
S (xt; Tt; t)  U o (xt; Tt; t) + Uy (xt; Tt; t) 

~U o (xt) + ~U
y (xt)

:
The Nash bargaining solution maximizes the Nash product,
U o (xt; Tt; t)  ~U o (xt)

Uy (xt; Tt; t)  ~Uy (xt)

:
It is well known that when there are lump sum transfers ( is unconstrained)
the bargaining solution maximizes surplus, which is equivalent to maximizing
aggregate lifetime welfare, the maximand in equation (14). That maximand
does not involve t. The choice of  enables decisionmakers to make a lump
sum transfer between generations. In this case, the transfer is chosen to
split the surplus evenly between the two generations, implying:
U o (xt; Tt; t)  ~U o (xt) = Uy (xt; Tt; t)  ~Uy (xt) =)
U o (xt; Tt; t)  Uy (xt; Tt; t) = ~U o (xt)  ~Uy (xt)
Using the formulae for equilibrium and disagreement payo¤s and solving the
last equation for t gives
t =  (xt) =
1
2
+
( (xt))  w ( (xt))
2R( (xt))
+
1
2p (xt;(xt))R( (xt))
C
(B.2)
with the denition
C  (xt;(xt))  1
1 + 
p (xt+1;(xt+1)) (1   (xt+1))R ( (xt+1)) 

~U o (xt)  ~Uy (xt)

:
The function  appears in the denition of C, both explicitly and implicitly
via the denition of ~Uy (xt). Therefore, equation (B.2) is a functional in
. We numerically approximate the xed point to this equation, and to
the functional equation that determines . If  is constrained, and the
constraint is binding, then it is no longer the case that aggregate surplus is
split equally between the two generations. In that case, the equilibrium Tt
that maximizes the Nash product, does not maximize aggregate surplus.
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B4 Numerics
We approximate (xt+1) and  (xt+1;(xt+1))   (xt+1) as polynomials in
xt+1, and nd coe¢ cients of those polynomials so that the solution to
maxTt P
  (xt; Tt)Y (Tt)+n
 (xt+1) +
1
1+
P (xt+1;(xt+1)) [ ( (xt+1)) + (1   (xt+1))R( (xt+1))]
o
subject to xt+1 = (1 + rt(xt; Tt))xt with x0 given.
approximately equals (xt). Appendix B3 explains the functional equation
used to approximate  in the Nash bargaining case. In the probabilistic vot-
ing model,  is a known constant. We use 13-degree Chebyshev polynomials
evaluated at 13 Chebyshev nodes on the [0:1; 0:9] interval. At each node the
recursion dening (xt;(xt)),
 (xt) =
1
1 + 

p (xt+1;(xt+1)) ( (xt+1)) +  (xt+1)
	
(B.3)
and the optimality condition
d
dTt
h
P  (xt; Tt)Y (Tt) + 11+

i
= 0
with 
 
n
 (xt+1) +
1
1+
P (xt+1;(xt+1)) [ ( (xt+1)) + (1   (xt+1))R( (xt+1))]
o
(B.4)
subject to xt+1 = (1 + rt(xt; Tt))xt and Tt = (xt) must be satised. If  is
endogenous, we additionally require that t = ~ (xt) =  (xt) with ~ (xt) as
explained in Appendix B3.
Starting with an initial guess for the coe¢ cients of the approximations
of  () and () and, possibly,  (), we evaluate the right side of equation
(B.3) for at each node. Using these function values, we obtain new coe¢ cient
values for the approximation of  (). We then use the optimality condition
(B.4) to nd the values of () at the nodes; we use those values to update
the coe¢ cients for the approximation of (). For endogenous , the new
coe¢ cients for  () and() also allow the updating of the coe¢ cients for the
approximation of  (). We repeat this iteration until the coe¢ cientsrelative
di¤erence between iterations falls below 10 6. See chapter 6 of Miranda and
Fackler (2002) for details.
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Figure 5: Deviation of asset price (left) and policy function (right) approxi-
mation from true value outside of approximation nodes for the e¢ cient bar-
gaining (solid) and the social planners (dot-dashed) problems
Figures 5 graph the di¤erences (the residuals) between the right and
left sides of equations (B.3) and (B.4), respectively. These residuals equal
0 at the nodes, because we set both the degree of the polynomial and the
number of nodes equal to n. We choose n = 13 to ensure that residuals
are at least 5 orders of magnitudes below the solution values on the [0:1; 0:9]
interval.
B5 Robustness checks
We computed two variations as a further robustness check. In the rst
variation, young agents select the current tax and receive all of the surplus,
but have to compensate the old generation to ensure that the latters welfare
does not fall below a default level. This default level equals their welfare
under the tax chosen in the previous period. The rationale for this model is
that inertia favors the existing tax, and that young agents have to compensate
the now-old agents to persuade them to change the tax that the latter chose
when they were young. For this experiment we set  = 1. We nd that
this variation results in a tax policy very close to, but slightly lower than
the policy under the previous formulation with  = 1. We conclude that
our results are not sensitive to changes in  or to moderate changes in the
structure of the political economy model.
In the second variation, motivated by Proposition 5 and the comments
following it,  = 0. Here, the old in the rst period to propose a transfer rate
. Conditional on this choice, the old and the young each propose a constant
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tax. Due to inertia, society chooses the smaller of these two taxes. We
then conrmed numerically that this tax is time consistent. Future young
generations would like to lower the tax and future old generations would
like to increase it, but the welfare gain that either achieves is insu¢ cient to
compensate the other. Therefore, no proposed change achieves consensus.
The belief in the initial period that the tax will be constant is therefore
conrmed by the equilibrium. The steady state stock is about 2% higher
than in the political economy framework (with  = 0) and 10% lower than
under the social planner.
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